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The International Safety Management (ISM) Code, made mandatory in 1998, dictates 
the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) on every vessel engaged 
in international shipping. This international standard provides a loose framework 
around which SMS procedures are required to be written, placing implementation of 
safety management into the hands of individual companies. In this thesis, vessel 
safety management systems are viewed through the lens of systems engineering, 
complete with requirements, user roles, and standards of failure. Furthermore, this 
thesis analyzes the risks of improperly implemented safety management systems 
onboard commercial vessels utilizing a hybrid of the Barrier-BowTie Model and 
Potential Problem Analysis Integration. Additionally, the risk analysis in this thesis 
stems from trends associated with international (non-United States flagged) vessel 
detentions in U.S. ports and the related detention-related deficiencies found during 
U.S. Coast Guard Port State examinations.  Lastly, an extensive literature review into 
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Chapter 1: Introduction1 
Section 1.1: Introduction 
In 1998, adherence to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was 
made mandatory by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for all commercial 
vessels over 500 gross tons that are shipping products internationally. This international 
standard dictates the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS), which 
includes procedures for emergency situations, training, normal vessel operations, 
reporting emergencies, and the maintenance of critical and non-critical ship systems 
(About IMO, 2018).  Because each vessel is unique and each management company is 
different, the ISM Code provides only a framework for creating these procedures in 
coordination with other safety standards and leaves the standard of safety to be set by 
the individual companies. Member states that are party to the IMO, have developed 
port state control examination programs to enforce and regulate the ISM code and other 
IMO standards.   
Section 1.2: Problem Statement 
The implementation of a Vessel Safety Management System (SMS) is 
mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on every vessel engaged 
in international shipping. However, many vessel SMSs experience failures, especially 
in their implementation, due to several factors explored in this thesis. This can cause 
                                                 
1 Portions of this section/chapter have been taken from “Examining Vessel Safety Management through Trends in Vessel 
Detentions onboard International Vessels from 2004 to 2017” written by Kimberly Gates and Dr. J.W. Herrmann. This 






the vessel to be detained for one or more days, which in turn costs the vessel 
stakeholders hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost time and expenditures to correct 
the deficiencies. Furthermore, failures of vessel SMSs can cause maritime accidents, 
which can lead to severe pollution, death or injury of crew members or bystanders, 
and/or serious damage or loss of the entire vessel. This thesis uses the Barrier-
BowTie Model and the Potential Problem Analysis Method to analyze the risks 
associated with an improperly implemented SMS.  
Section 1.3: System of Interest Description 
Subsection 1.3.1: System Description 
As described in the system context-level diagram in Figure 1, there are three 
areas in the vessel safety management system domain: Vessel SMS, Environment, 
and Users. A Vessel SMS has 9 subsystems, which correspond to the different aspects 
covered under the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code). The 
Environment consists of the Vessel Systems and the Vessel’s Operating Environment, 
which include the physical components that are referred to in the SMS. The different 
users of the Vessel SMS are the Vessel Crew, the Vessel Management Company, the 
Vessel Owner, the Vessel Chartering Company, the Flag State, and the Port State. 
The roles of these users are described in Subsection 1.2.2. Please note this section 
capitalizes the nouns that are used as labels in the systems modeling language 










Figure 1. Vessel SMS Context-Level Block Definition Diagram 
 
 







Figure 2.Vessel SMS System-Level Block Definition Diagram 
 
Subsection 1.3.2: Roles of Users 
The different users of the Vessel SMS are the Vessel Crew, the Vessel 
Management Company, the Vessel Owner, the Vessel Chartering Company, the Flag 
State, and the Port State. The Vessel Crew are the primary users of the Vessel SMS, 
and include the vessel’s Master, the members of Deck Department including the 
Chief Officer, and the members of the Engineering Department including the Chief 
Engineer Officer. They are responsible for implementing the SMS onboard the vessel 





their role in the crew. The Vessel’s Master is specifically responsible for the safety of 
the vessel and its crew.  
 The Vessel Owner owns the vessel that is being used by the Vessel Chartering 
Company to ship goods and products from one port to another. The Vessel Owner is 
responsible for writing the SMS, specifically the SMS Manual in conjunction with the 
Vessel Management Company. The Vessel Owner and the Vessel Management 
Company often have intertwined roles with the owner being the managing owner and 
head of the Vessel Management Company.  
 The Vessel Management Company is responsible for administrative aspects of 
the international shipping business for the vessel to include hiring, handling of 
contracts, pay, leave, and schedules for the Vessel Crew. The Vessel Management 
Company is also responsible for conducting regular audits and inspections of all the 
different subsystems of the Vessel SMS to ensure compliance with the ISM Code. 
Lastly the Vessel Management Company liaises with the Vessel Chartering Company 
on schedule, shipping requirements, and safety of cargo.  
 The Vessel Chartering Company owns the cargo (products or goods) that are 
being shipped internationally. They have a joint responsibility with the Vessel 
Management Company to ensure the cargo is packaged and shipped in accordance 
with the Vessel SMS and the ISM Code.  
 The Flag State is the country under which the vessel sails. The Flag State has 
additional regulations in addition to the IMO regulations that the vessel must follow. 
Furthermore, the Flag State is responsible for auditing the vessel’s SMS and ensuring 





Certificate and the SMS Certificate. Often, the Flag State will appoint classification 
society representatives to conduct these annual audits of the SMS and issue 
certifications, however, the ultimate authority lies with the Flag State. 
 Finally, the Port State is the country where the vessel makes port.  Port States 
employ Port State Control Officers who conduct annual examinations when a vessel 
enters a port. These examinations include a safety component and a security 
component. The safety examinations include a review of the SMS manual and 
certificates and ensuring the vessel and its crew are complying with the ISM Code as 
written in the SMS Manual.  
Subsection 1.3.3: Vessel Safety Management Systems Development Process 
 The requirements for developing a Vessel SMS are specified in the ISM Code. 
The principal requirement is that each system and subsystem detailed in Section 1.3.1 
must be included in the Vessel SMS. The main document that contains the Vessel 
SMS is called the Vessel SMS Manual. Each vessel must have an individually 
tailored SMS manual. The vessel management company is responsible for developing 
the SMS and creating the vessel specific SMS manual. Once the vessel SMS is 
created, it is implemented and evaluated by the vessel’s crew. Then, it undergoes an 
initial audit by the vessel’s Flag State, usually through an authorized Classification 
Society. This audit process verifies that the vessel SMS, including the SMS manual, 
meets the requirements of the ISM Code as written and is implemented properly 
onboard the vessel. If requirements are not met or there are deficiencies with the 
implementation of the SMS, the Flag State (or Classification Society) will issue a 





timeframe. A non-conformity is similar in nature to a deficiency, explained in 
Subsection 1.3.4, however, it is not typically associated with a financial penalty and is 
often quickly resolved. These non-conformities can include restrictions to specific 
operations until they are resolved, but often do not stop the vessel from operating or 
carrying cargo completely. Only the Flag State (or Classification Society) can resolve 
non-conformities on the vessel.  
 Additionally, during the initial audit process, the SMS Certificate and 
Document of Compliance are issued, certifying the SMS onboard meets the 
requirements of the ISM Code. These certificates are typically issued even if there are 
non-conformities on the vessel; the document of non-conformity acts as an addendum 
to the certificates.  
 Subsection 1.3.4: Defining Failure of Vessel Safety Management Systems 
 For the purposes of this thesis, failure of a vessel SMS is defined by the lack 
of full implementation of the approved SMS, which is constitutes a violation of the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code. It is assumed in this thesis that the 
SMS onboard any vessel has undergone the appropriate approval process, which 
includes approval by the Flag State and the vessel’s management company.  This 
approval process validates that the vessel SMS, created by the vessel management 
company, complies with the ISM Code and is specific to the vessel type, engineering 
systems onboard, and the crew makeup.  
Violations of the ISM Code are also referred to as a type of deficiency for the 
purposes of this thesis. There are three ways ISM deficiencies can be identified for 





management company, conducts regular reviews of the SMS, which usually includes 
a review of one subsystem at a time. Secondly, the vessel’s Flag State conducts 
annual audits of the vessel SMS which includes looking at the implementation of 
every subsystem of the SMS to verify compliance with ISM Code. Lastly, several 
Port States will conduct safety examinations of the vessel, which include a review of 
how the vessel is implementing the approved SMS onboard. Port state examinations 
are less focused on whether the SMS meets the ISM Code and more on the 
implementation of already approved SMS.  Port state examinations are conducted 
annually in the United States on vessels that frequent the United States and do not 
have a history of safety or security deficiencies. This thesis will focus on the failures 
of a vessel SMS found during Port State Control examinations in the United States 
from 2004-2017.  
Section 1.4: Research Questions 
 This thesis will endeavor to answer the following research questions. First, 
what are the risks (causes) of vessel detentions associated with failures to implement 
a vessel SMS? This will be answered through a detailed data and risk analysis, 
specifically focusing on the failure to implement vessel SMS on international 
commercial vessels identified by the U.S Coast Guard during port state control 
examinations.  
Secondly, how can the Barrier-BowTie and the Potential Problem Analysis 
Method be integrated and utilized to analyze those risks? These methods have been 





BowTie and Potential Problem Analysis have yet to be integrated in the area of 
maritime SMS.  
Lastly, which mitigation strategies would be most effective to prevent the 
risks identified in the analysis? The goal of the risk analysis is to highlight hazards 
that pose the most severe risk to the stakeholders. This thesis will explore and 









Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
Section 2.1: Literature Review2 
Since the ISM Code was made mandatory for international commercial 
vessels in 1998, the risks associated with failing to properly implement an effective 
SMS has been a key research topic. Størkersen et al. (2017) analyzed the Norwegian 
high-speed craft industry and the influence that regulators, the ISM code, and 
organizational factors have over operational safety.  After conducting 47 interviews 
with maritime authorities, company management, and shipboard crews, Størkersen et 
al. drew the following conclusions:  
1. In general, it is perceived that safety regulations (ISM Code) increase 
safety awareness onboard vessels.  
2. Although companies are responsible for determining what is safe enough 
due to self-regulation in ISM Code, they are still looking to the 
government to provide the definition.  
3. There is an over-reliance on the checklist and not on critical thinking when 
it comes to safety critical decisions.  
4. In general, safety-related administrative work is deemed unimportant, and 
takes time away from safety critical tasks.  
The last conclusion highlights a potential threat to failing to implement a vessel SMS, 
which falls under the categories of crew complacency and increased complexity. 
                                                 
2 Portions of this section have been taken from “Examining Vessel Safety Management through Trends in Vessel Detentions 
onboard International Vessels from 2004 to 2017” written by Kimberly Gates and Dr. J.W. Herrmann. This paper is currently 





Simplifying procedures and minimizing distractions on the bridge were proposed as 
two solutions to these issues (Storkensen et al., 2017). 
 Lappalainen (2008) also discussed the challenges with implementing SMSs 
onboard Finnish vessels and proposed a performance measurement system that would 
include safety criteria such as accident rate/injury frequency, vessel delays, insurance 
claims, and safety culture. The main problems with this assessment of safety was that 
there is a lack of standard interpretation for ISM Code and that mariners were 
reluctant to report safety issues for fear of reprisal (Lappalainen 2008). Within the 
vessel SMS, there are currently no requirements for confidential reporting in the ISM 
Code, and the fear of reprisal for crew members is a significant barrier to the 
implementation of an effective vessel SMS.  
 Furthermore, there are many challenges to quantifying and establishing safety-
related analysis techniques. Sii et al. (2001) identified several problems to quantifying 
safety assessments, including a lack of safety data, the costs of reducing risk, and 
limited operational experience with newer systems. They proposed three safety 
optimization frameworks for assessing risk to include a design trade-off analysis, a 
decision support system based on artificial neural networks (ANN), and a fuzzy logic-
based system.   
 Hänninen and Kujala (2014) used Finnish port state control inspection and 
accident data (from 2004 to 2010) and Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) to explore 
how port state control (PSC) inspection results (deficiencies) are linked to each other 
and maritime accidents. The data used in this study was from the Finnish port state 





VTS incident and violation data (2004-2008). They concluded that ship type was the 
most important knowledge factor for decreasing the uncertainty in accident 
involvement, especially when linked with structural condition and radio 
communication information. Analogous to this thesis, this study analyzed port state 
control inspection data and successfully proved there is a relationship between 
deficiencies and vessel accidents.  
 Similarly, Trucco et al. (2008) used BBNs and fault tree diagrams to model 
organizational and operation factors and analyze the risk of specific types of 
accidents.  They utilized expert opinion as prior knowledge and updated this with 
Italian maritime accident data to develop conditional probabilities and links between 
accident data and organizational factors to better analyze risk. This study adds to the 
knowledge about the effectiveness of vessel safety programs by analyzing data over a 
fourteen-year period and presenting trends that provide new insights. 
Section 2.2: Barrier BowTie Model Literature Review 
 As seen in an article by Trbojevic and Carr (2000) and in an article by 
Clothier et al. (2018), the Barrier BowTie Model is a risk analysis model that utilizes 
graphics to represent the different components of the risk analysis, including the risk 
management/controls component. This model has been used by many different 
industries including the oil and gas industries, medical field, and aviation sector. 
Trbojevic and Carr used Barrier BowTie models to analyze the risks and hazards for 
improving port safety in the hopes of reducing navigation errors and vessel accidents. 
They also integrated hazard analysis into the Barrier BowTie Model and utilized the 





the Barrier BowTie model that they identified were that it is a great communication 
tool for stakeholders and that it is a useful day-to-day risk management tool for port 
personnel since it connects everyday tasks to hazard control and recovery measures 
(Trbojevic and Carr, 2000).  
 Clothier et al. (2018) applied Barrier BowTie models to the hazards and risks 
posed by remotely piloted aircraft to persons on the ground. They identified several 
advantages of utilizing Barrier BowTie models in their analysis. First, Barrier 
BowTie models allow for the incorporation of many different risk analysis 
components including the threats, causes, consequences, and controls (barriers). 
Furthermore, the relationships that exist between these components are easily 
distinguished in a Barrier BowTie model. Additionally, multiple domains of risk can 
be incorporated in Barrier BowTie models, such as human error, organizational risk, 
mechanical system failure, and procedural error. Barrier BowTie models can also be 
used as a framework and combined with other risk analysis models and techniques, 
such as failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMEA) and human factor 
analysis. Lastly, Barrier BowTie models emphasize the importance of controlling 
risks and establishing the layers of controls that are associated with threats and 
consequences (Clothier et al. 2018).  
 On the other hand, they also acknowledged some disadvantages to using 
Barrier BowTie models. Each Barrier BowTie model has only one top event and 
additional models could have dependencies that are not easily distinguished in the 
model due to these separate top events. Furthermore, the barriers in the model 





dependence can exist. These dependencies cannot be easily displayed in the model 
and therefore need to be identified in a separate analysis (Clothier et al. 2018). 
Section 2.3: Further Research Questions 
 This literature review draws out many different techniques for analyzing 
vessel SMSs and identifying safety risks onboard vessels. An additional research 
question that this thesis will seek to answer is if a relationship can be drawn between 
port state control deficiency data and the causes of vessel SMS failures.  
 





Chapter 3: Approach3 
Section 3.1: Data Collection Approach 
The goal of a port state control program is to identify and eliminate 
substandard vessels from the territorial waters of that nation. A substandard vessel is 
defined in Procedures for Port State Control as “a ship whose hull, machinery, 
equipment, or operational safety is substantially below the standards required by the 
relevant convention” (Procedures for Port State Control, 2017). If a vessel is found to 
be substandard during a port state control examination, then the vessel is detained in 
the waters of that port state until the severe deficiency can be rectified. This action is 
called a vessel detention and is only taken when the port state deems that the vessel or 
its crew are a danger to themselves, the environment or other vessels (Procedures for 
Port State Control, 2017). 
In the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard administers the port state control 
program and conducts two types of vessel examinations in accordance with (IAW) 
the Procedures for Port State Control: safety examination and security examination.  
A safety examination verifies the safe operation of the various essential systems 
onboard the vessel.  A security examination ensures adequate control of cargo and 
persons on and off the vessel. Every international vessel that arrives at a U.S. port is 
screened to determine if the vessel needs to undergo a port state control 
examination.  In general, an international vessel will undergo an annual port state 
control examination, which will include both safety and security examinations. 
                                                 
3 Portions of this chapter have been taken from “Examining Vessel Safety Management through Trends in Vessel Detentions 
onboard International Vessels from 2004 to 2017” written by Kimberly Gates and Dr. J.W. Herrmann. This paper is currently 





Vessels with a history of serious safety or security deficiencies may be examined 
more frequently.  
This thesis used two datasets built from U.S. Coast Guard data systems.  The 
Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI) system compiles deficiency and detention 
data from a vessel inspection database.  The first dataset was created by searching the 
CGBI for a list of detention-related deficiencies from 2004 to 2017 with the following 
search criteria: Vessel Flag: Foreign, Detention: Yes, and Activity Status: Closed. 
Table 1 summarizes the fields of data that were collected on June 18, 2018.  
Table 1. Fields of Data Collected from USCG Data System 
Field Units Type of Data 
Activity Date Month/Day/Year Date 
Fiscal Year Year Date 
Fiscal Quarter N/a Numerical 
Calendar Year Year Numerical 
Calendar Quarter N/a Numerical 
Month N/a Numerical 







Area N/a Text 
District N/a Text 
Department N/a Text 
Deficiency Status N/a Text 
Issue Date Month/Day/Year Date 
System  N/a Categorical 
Subsystem N/a Categorical 
Component N/a Categorical 






Vessel Name N/a Text 
Vessel Class N/a Categorical 
Vessel Type N/a Categorical 










Vessel Age Years Numerical 
Length Feet Numerical 
Default Gross 
Tonnage 
Gross Tons Numerical 
Regulatory Gross 
Tonnage 
Gross Tons Numerical 
ITC Gross 
Tonnage 
Gross Tons Numerical 
 
This search resulted in the collection of 15,677 detention-related deficiencies 
(referred to as simply “deficiencies” in following sections). These deficiencies were 
further sorted by Year, Vessel Age, Vessel Type, and System using Microsoft Excel. 
The still open detention activities were not included in the dataset since they included 
on-going investigations/cases.  
 A second dataset was created in Microsoft Excel through the collection vessel 
information from the U.S. Coast Guard’s annual Port State Control reports (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2018). The information was compiled from 2004 through the 2017 
editions of this report. It included general arrival data, number of security and safety 





Section 3.2: Data Analysis Approach 
Microsoft Excel was used to graph and analyze the general data trends in both 
datasets. These included the trends in vessel arrivals, port state control examinations, 
deficiencies, detentions, and age of vessels detained from 2004-2017.  In addition to 
Microsoft Excel, TreeMap software was used to analyze data trends of the categorical 
data, using the Excel spreadsheet with the CGBI deficiency data as an input 
(“TreeMap”, 2018). The data trends that were analyzed in this thesis were trends 
based on deficiency system, trends based on vessel age, and trends based on vessel 
service.  
Furthermore, Matlab was utilized to examine the trends in vessel age through 
a k-means cluster analysis (“k-means Clustering”, 2019). The number of clusters (k) 
was varied from 2 to 10 in order to see how the cluster patterns changed. This 
analysis was performed in order to better understand the age clusters based on the 
numbers of SMS detentions and the deficient SMS components. The input for this k-
means analysis included only vessel detentions that contained SMS deficiencies and 
only the first instance of such a detention for a particular unique vessel. This was 
done to remove any duplications of the same vessels across multiple age categories. 
Lastly, the data was normalized by taking the number of deficiencies in each SMS 






Section 3.3: Risk Analysis Approach 
Subsection 3.3.1: Barrier BowTie Model 
The Barrier BowTie Model is a risk assessment tool that creates a structured 
analysis of risky scenarios in order to communicate how they develop, and the 
consequences and barriers associated. As described in BowTie XP’s “Bowtie 
Methodology Manual,” this risk assessment method includes an eight-step process to 
analyze the risk scenario and develop the model. These steps include:  
1. Identify Hazards  
a. Hazards are defined as controlled elements of a scenario that introduce 
risk. These can be specific activities, situations, or physical hazards. 
For example, driving a car is a hazard because it is a controlled 
situation, but introduces risks into the scenario of everyday routine.  
2. Identify Top Events 
a. Top Events are based on the hazards identified in Step 1 and are 
defined as the events that causes control over a hazard to be lost. Due 
to this event, there is a potential exposure to the stakeholder or user(s) 
of the system.   
3. Identify Threats 
a. Threats are defined in this model as the independent causes of the top 
events.  
4. Identify Consequences 
a. The consequences are the undesired, harmful effects of the top event to 





5. Identify Preventive Barriers 
a. Preventive barriers are controls placed in the system that prevent the 
top event from occurring.  
6. Identify Recovery Barriers 
a. Recovery barriers are controls placed in the system that mitigate the 
consequences that result from the top event.  
7. Identify Escalation Factors 
a. Escalation factors are defined as conditions or actions that would allow 
the barrier (preventive or recovery) to fail.  
8. Identify Escalation Factor Barriers 
a. Escalation Factor Barriers allow the preventive or recovery barrier to 
remain in place despite the potential for an escalation factor.  
In this thesis, all eight steps will be utilized to create a model of the risks involved 
with implementing a vessel SMS and work through mitigation strategies (barriers). 
BowTieXP’s software will be used to build the risk analysis model.  
Subsection 3.3.2: Barrier BowTie Selection 
The Barrier BowTie Model was selected for this thesis because of its ability to 
display a majority of the risk analysis components in a cohesive model, as well as its 
emphasis on control measures to be taken to prevent vessel detentions caused by SMS 
failures. Utilizing a model will allow for easier risk communication to stakeholders 
because it is easy to understand and interpret. Furthermore, a Barrier BowTie model 
is appropriate for analyzing risks associated with SMS implementation failures 





Additionally, it can be used in conjunction with Potential Problem Analysis, which is 
a well-known risk analysis method to analyze safety related risks. Lastly, Barrier 
BowTie models have been proven effective in the aviation sector to analyze specific 
safety management risks, such as in Clothier, Williams, and Hayhurst (2018), 
described in Section 2.2.  
Subsection 3.3.3: Potential Problem Analysis  
Potential Problem Analysis (PPA) is a risk analysis method that was created 
by Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe and outlined in their book, The New 
Rational Manager (1997). This method is based on the premise that good managers 
are constantly looking toward future problems and trying to mitigate their 
consequences. This book describes Potential Problem Analysis as a framework with 
the following steps for analyzing and mitigating risk:  
1. Define the Action: The end state or goal of the action to be taken. 
2. List all Potential Problems associated: The potential unfavorable results 
that need to be addressed in this analysis. 
3. Identify the causes of the potential problems.  
4. Ascertain actions to prevent the causes of potential problems.  
5. Define measures to mitigate effects should the problem occur.  
6. Place subsystems within the system to indicate that a potential problem 





Subsection 3.3.4: Integrated Risk Analysis 
In this thesis, Potential Problem Analysis will be integrated into the Barrier 
BowTie Model to create a complete risk analysis to include mitigation strategies. All 
steps of the Barrier BowTie Model will be utilized and a graphical model created 
using information generated through Potential Problem Analysis. Following the steps 
of PPA outlined in Section 3.3.3, I will integrate the Barrier BowTie steps using the 
following process. First, in the “Define” step of PPA, the action will be defined as 
creating a Barrier BowTie Model that analyzes vessel SMS failures. In the second 
step of PPA, the potential problem is characterized as the top event in the Barrier 
BowTie model and in this thesis, the top event will be vessel detention due to vessel 
SMS failures. Thirdly, the causes of the top event/potential problem will be identified 
and these causes will be the threats in the Barrier BowTie Model. Next, during the 
fourth step of PPA, the actions to prevent the causes or threats are the preventive 
barriers, and will be identified in this step. Also, in this step, the escalation factors 
and barriers will be identified since it is related to the preventive barriers. The fifth 
step of PPA includes describing measures to mitigate effects if the problem occurs. 
During this step, the recovery barriers of the Barrier BowTie Model will be defined. 
This step will complete the Barrier BowTie Model. Lastly, in step six of the PPA, the 
current system triggers, which identify that the top event/potential problem has 
occurred, will be listed in a separate table. The Barrier BowTie Model and the system 





Chapter 4: Data Analysis4 
Section 4.1: General Vessel Data 
Subsection 4.1.1: Vessel Arrival Data 
 From 2004 to 2017, there was an average of 77,438 vessel arrivals/year into 
the ports of the United States. This included each arrival into a port and repeated 
vessel arrivals along regular routes throughout the year. As shown in Figure 3, vessel 
arrivals have varied narrowly per year from 2004 to 2017 with a sharp increase in 
2006.  
 
Figure 3. Total Vessel Arrivals in U.S. Ports from 2004-2017 
In looking at the number of unique vessels arriving in U.S. ports, however, 
there has been a steady increase from 2004 to 2017. This is shown in Figure 4. The 
                                                 
4 Portions of this chapter have been taken from “Examining Vessel Safety Management through Trends in Vessel Detentions 
onboard International Vessels from 2004 to 2017” written by Kimberly Gates and Dr. J.W. Herrmann. This paper is currently 

























average number of unique vessels arriving to the U.S. is 8,846 vessels in that same 
time period.  
 
 Figure 4. Unique Vessel Arrivals from 2004-2017 to U.S. Ports 
Subsection 4.1.2: Vessel Examination, Detention, and Deficiency Data 
 From 2004 to 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a total of 139,169 port 
state control safety examinations. In stark contrast to the increase in unique vessel 
arrivals, the number of port state control examinations steadily decreased from 2004 
to 2017, with the exception of 2008 which showed a 10% increase from the previous 
year. Figure 5 shows this decreasing trend in port state control safety examination in 




























Figure 5. Port State Control Safety Examinations from 2004-2017 in U.S. 
From 2004 to 2017, the total number of detentions was 2,072. As seen in 
Figure 6, the number of detentions remained steady with an average of 142 per a year 
since 2004. The greatest number of detentions was 216 in 2015.  Since that sharp 
increase in 2015, the detentions in 2016 and 2017 were remarkably low.  
 















































In that same time period, the total number of detention-related deficiencies on 
foreign flagged vessels was 15,677 with an average of 8 deficiencies for each 
detention. As seen in Figure 7, the number of deficiencies per a year follows a similar 
pattern as the number of detentions. 
 
Figure 7. Detention-Related Deficiencies from 2004-2017 
Section 4.2: Data Trends by Deficiency System 
When each deficiency is entered into the U.S. Coast Guard’s PSC 
examination database, it is classified by the system and subsystem which is deficient. 
For example, if the sprinkler system in the engine room does not operate, this 
deficiency would be inputted as a firefighting deficiency under the subsystem of fire 
suppression. Deficiency data is recorded by the PSC Examiner and tabulated in the 
CGBI database. To represent the number of deficiencies by system, TreeMaps were 
created that show the results as blocks.  Each small block has the same area and 
represents one deficiency.  The color of the block indicates the system, subsystem, or 





























In Figure 8, the detention-related deficiencies from 2004 to 2017 are 
organized by system. The number of deficiencies for each system are represented by 
the number of blocks under each system category. It can be seen that 
Operations/Management (18%), Firefighting (13.8%), Engineering (13.6%), and 
Documentation (11.7%) are the four system categories with the most deficiencies 
during detentions from 2004-2017.  
 
Figure 8. TreeMap of Detention-Related Deficient System-Types Organized by Most Frequent (2004-
2017) 
As seen in Figure 9, among the deficiencies in the Operations/Management 
system, the subsystems Vessel Safety Management (34%) and Security (33%) have 







Figure 9. TreeMap of Operations/Management Subsystems from 2004-2007 
 Figure 10 summarizes the SMS components under SMS Subsystem in a 
pareto chart. This pareto chart emphasizes that under the Vessel Safety Management 
subsystem, the most commonly deficient component is the Maintenance of 
Ship/Equipment, making up approximately 40% of all SMS deficiencies. This 
demonstrates that a failure to maintain the vessel and ship equipment is the most 
common issue onboard vessels in relation to implementing a vessel SMS, which will 
deem the vessel unsafe to operate and result in a detention. The pareto chart in Figure 
20 also shows that the following SMS deficiency components account for 70% of all 
the SMS deficiencies resulting in detentions: Maintenance of Ship/Equipment, 
Company Responsibility/Authority, Master Responsibility/Authority, and 





analysis in Chapter 5. Table 2 underscores the number of deficiencies in each SMS 
component category.  
 
 





Table 2. Number of Safety Management System Deficiencies (Resulting in Detentions) by Component 
from 2004-2017 
 
Section 4.3: Data Trends by Vessel Age 
The average ship age of all vessels detained from 2004 to 2017 was 29 years. 
As shown in Figure 11, the average ship age of detained vessels per a year steadily 
decreased in a near linear fashion from 36 in 2004 to 22 in 2017.  







Maintenance of Ship/Equipment 329
Master's Responsibility/Authority 72
Plans for Shipboard Operations 43
Reports and Analysis 35
Resources and Personnel 19







Figure 11. Average Ship Age for Vessels Detained from 2004-2017 
  
As part of this thesis, the impact of ship age on detention-related deficiencies 
was analyzed. The vessel age categories were broken into 6 categories based on 10-
year age ranges. In the data set used, new vessels (<one-year-old) still show as 1-year 
old. Therefore, it is assumed that the range category for vessels aged “1-10 years” 
also includes select vessels that are less than 1 year old.  
As shown in Figure 12, the average number of deficiencies per detention 
increased as the ship age increased across 2004-2017. This demonstrates that the 

























older vessels that were detained had more deficiencies and therefore, needed 
additional resources to correct those deficiencies prior to release from detention.  
 
Figure 12. Average Deficiencies per Each Detention Based on Age Ranges (Data from 2004-2017) 
  
The detention rate was calculated as the number of detained vessels divided 
by the total number of safety examinations in a given year and the deficiency rate was 
calculated as the number of detention-related deficiencies divided by the total number 
of safety examinations in a given year.  One limitation of the data sets is that there is 
no data in regards to the number of safety examination per each age category, so the 
number of safety examinations are based on the year.  
As shown in Figure 13, the 11-20 year and 31-40-year age categories had the 




































Figure 13.  Detention Rate per Safety Examination Based on Age Categories (2004-2017) 
 






































































The 31-40-year age category had the highest deficiency rate (0.034) and the 
51+ year age category had the lowest deficiency rate (0.0054). This demonstrates that 
although the older vessels (51+ age category) had more deficiencies occurring at each 
detention, the overall number of detentions and detention-related deficiencies is 
notably less per each safety examination than any other age category. In contrast, the 
31-40-year age category had a distinctly higher rate of detentions and deficiencies. 
Postulating that this trend holds true for future vessels, this demonstrates that if a 
vessel is deemed to need a port state control safety examination in this age category 
(31-40 years old), it is more likely to result in a detention as opposed to another age 
category.  
In dividing the detention-related deficiency data from 2004-2017 into age 
bins, the percentage of deficiencies for each system per each age bin were 
determined. For the age bin 1-10 years, Figure 15 shows that in this age bin, a 
majority of deficiencies were in Ops/Management system (24%). Additionally, 19% 
were in the Firefighting system, 14% were in the Documentation system, and 11% 
were in the Engineering system. Similarly, for the 11-20-year age bin, 22% 





system, 13% were in the Engineering system, and 13% were in the Documentation 
system. Figure 16 shows the TreeMap for this age bin.  
 









Figure 16. TreeMap of the Deficiency Systems in Age Bin 11-20 years 
Although the 21-30-year age bin had the same top four systems in regards to 
deficiencies, there was a lesser percentage of Ops/Management system deficiencies 
(18%) and a greater percentage of Engineering system deficiencies (16%) when 
compared with the previous two age bins. Figure 17 represents this breakdown and 
also shows that 15% of deficiencies were from Firefighting system deficiencies and 






Figure 17. TreeMap of the Deficiency Systems in Age Bin 21-30 years 
  
For the 31-40-year age bin, Operations/Management deficiencies made up 
18% of all deficiencies, Engineering system deficiencies made up 15%, Firefighting 
system deficiencies made up 13%, and Documentation system deficiencies made up 
10%. This is shown in Figure 18, and differs greatly from the 41-50-year age bin 
shown in Figure 19. The 41-50-year age bin had the following deficiency breakdown: 
15% Documentation system deficiencies, 13% were Operations/Management 
deficiencies, 11% were Firefighting system deficiencies, and 11% were from 






Figure 18. TreeMap of the Deficiency Systems in Age Bin 31-40 years 
 






Differing greatly than any other age bin, the 51+ year age bin is comprised of 
13% Operations/Management system deficiencies, 11% Construction/Loadline 
system deficiencies, 11% Documentation system deficiencies, and 10% Firefighting 
system deficiencies. Seen in Figure 20, this age bin is the only age range that has 
Construction/Loadline systems deficiencies in the top 4 systems. Based on my 
experience, this is due to the fact that vessels older than 51 years usually have hull or 
structural member deficiencies due to the ship’s advanced age and the intense 
maintenance required on structural members is costly.  
 






 To validate these age trends and to further examine the age trends with the 
respect to SMS detentions, a k-means cluster analysis was performed. This analysis 
showed that the age clusters were loosely defined from age 1-39 years and then from 
age 40-58 years. This could be partially explained due to the majority of SMS 
deficiencies occurred on vessels that were 39 years old, specifically in the 
Maintenance of Ship/Equipment SMS component category. After age 39, the number 
of SMS deficiencies related to detentions sharply decreases, especially in the 
Maintenance of Ship/Equipment component category.  
Figure 21 shows a TreeMap of the SMS components for the age 1-39 bin 
based on the number of deficiencies in each component category. It can be seen that a 
majority (43%) of the SMS deficiencies that caused detentions, were due to the lack 
of maintenance to the vessel or equipment in this age range. The other top SMS 
deficiencies were Company Responsibility/Authority (10%), Master’s 
Responsibility/Authority (8%), Safety/Environmental Policy (7%), and 






Figure 21. TreeMap of the SMS Deficiencies Segregated by Component Type for Vessels Aged 1-39 
Figure 22 shows a TreeMap of the SMS components for the age 40-58 bin 
based on the number of deficiencies in each component category. In contrast to 
Figure 21, it can be seen that although the SMS deficiency that was the most frequent 
was still Maintenance of Ship/Equipment, it was drastically smaller percentage of the 
overall SMS deficiencies at 24%. In this age range, the other top SMS deficiencies 
also increased in percentage with both Company Responsibility/Authority and 
Master’s Responsibility/Authority each making up 16% and External 






Figure 22. TreeMap of the SMS Deficiencies Segregated by Component Type for Vessels Aged 40-58 
Section 4.4: Data Trends by Vessel Service 
In the dataset, each vessel belongs to one of fourteen different vessel services 
based on ship design and cargo type. These are freight ship, tank ship, public freight, 
offshore supply vessel, passenger vessel, towing vessel, commercial fishing vessel, 
freight barge, recreational, industrial vessel, research vessel, mobile offshore drilling 
unit (MODU), and unspecified. As shown in the TreeMap in Figure 23, the two 
vessels with the most detention-related deficiencies were categorized as freight ships 
(77%) and tank ships (14%). This TreeMap is organized by Vessel Service type and 
the color is based on vessel service type. Lastly, the size of the blocks indicates the 






Figure 23. TreeMap of Vessel Service Types Organized by Detention-Related Deficiencies Occurring 
Most Frequently (2004-2017) 
 
Figure 24 shows that from 2004 to 2017, 19% of all detentions involving 
freight ships included deficiencies in Operations and Management System. The other 
main system deficiencies for freight ship-detentions included Firefighting (14%), 
Engineering (15%), and Documentation (12%). Additionally, 16% of all tank ship 
detentions involved Operations/Management deficiencies. The additional major 
system deficiencies for tank ship-detentions are Deck/Cargo (16%), Firefighting 






Figure 24. TreeMap of Vessel Service Types Organized by Deficient Systems Most Occurring (2004-
2017) 
In regards to tank ships, the deck/cargo and operations/management systems 
had an equal amount of deficiencies. This is concurrent with my experiences, since 
tank ships carry hazardous cargos, which have additional and more extensive safety 









Chapter 5:  Risk Analysis 
Section 5.1: Defining Risk Analysis Framework 
Subsection 5.1.1: Risk Analysis Model 
 The risk analysis model is defined as a Barrier BowTie Model, which has 8 
main elements. These elements are the hazard, the top event, threats, consequences, 
preventive barriers, recovery barriers, escalation factors, and escalation factor 
barriers. These are further defined in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, Subsection 3.1.1.  Figure 
25 is an example of the Barrier BowTie Model created in BowTieXP software. It 
demonstrates the layout of the model elements.  
 
Figure 25. Example of Barrier BowTie Model 
 
 In Chapter 5, Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the process of developing the 
Barrier BowTie Model and refer to portions of the completed Barrier BowTie Model. 
The completed Barrier BowTie model can be seen in its entirety in Appendix B. 





Subsection 5.1.2: Assumptions and Limitations  
For the purposes of this thesis, there were specific assumptions made to 
complete the risk analysis and the limitations to the model set boundaries. The first 
assumption is that when the model refers to “a vessel” it is an internationally flagged 
vessel arriving into the United States that must comply with the international ISM 
Code standards. The second assumption is that the term “deficiency” is related to 
detention-related deficiencies. The third assumption for this model is that a vessel 
detention implies that a vessel failed to implement the vessel SMS. This is not true of 
all vessel detentions.  
 The first limitation is that due to time constraints, the risk analysis and model 
has not been validated by additional subject matter experts. The main information 
sources for development of this model are from my personal experiences in the U.S. 
Coast Guard, the literature review sources, and lastly from the data analysis in 
Chapter 4. The second limitation is that the Barrier BowTie Model software cannot 
incorporate the triggers identified during the Potential Problem Analysis portion of 
the risk analysis. They are listed separately in Section 5.3.3.  
Section 5.2: Risk Analysis 
Subsection 5.2.1: Hazard and Top Event Identification/Description 
In accordance with IP Bank B.V. (2015)’s BowTie XP: Bowtie Methodology 
Manual, a hazard is the source of risk under a specific condition. The hazard for this 
risk analysis is an International Vessel Operating in U.S. Waters and requiring a U.S. 





the hazard’s status from normal to abnormal. The top event for the risk analysis is a 
vessel detention, specifically one due to the failure to implement the vessel SMS 
onboard. There are other causes of vessel detentions, however, that is outside the 
scope of this thesis. Figure 26 shows the hazard and top event in the Barrier BowTie 
Model.  
 
Figure 26. Hazard and Top Event in Barrier BowTie Model 
 
Subsection 5.2.2: Identification of Threats and Consequences 
 Figure 27 shows the threats and consequences identified for this risk analysis. 
A substandard vessel is defined as “a ship whose hull, machinery, equipment, or 
operational safety is substantially below the standards required by the relevant 
convention” (Procedures for Port State Control, 2017). If a vessel is found to be 
substandard during a port state control examination, then the vessel is detained in the 
waters of that member state until the severe deficiency or deficiencies can be 
rectified. Therefore, all the threats, or causes of the top event, identified for this risk 
analysis are deficiencies related to the SMS that cause the vessel to be substandard 





 The consequences are defined by I.P. Bank B.V. (2015) as the undesired 
events due to the top event. For this risk analysis, the consequences affect the 
following vessel stakeholders: Vessel Management Company, Vessel Owner, Vessel 
Crew/Master. The consequences of financial loss and loss of time are related to each 
other since a delay in schedule will cost the vessel owner and vessel operating 
company from increased port and docking fees or delays in offloading cargo which 
can result in penalties. However, there are financial losses to the vessel 
owner/management company from vessel detentions that are not related to the 
schedule loss. These include financial impacts due to correcting vessel deficiencies 
causing the vessel detention, as well as the financial impact of early crew turnover to 
replace crew members that may have contributed to the vessel detention. The 
consequences of loss of reputation and the financial loss to the vessel 
owner/management company are also related because the company will experience a 
loss of business due to the detention and therefore will have decreased revenues, 
especially in the short term. Lastly, the consequence of increased PSC examination 
frequency is partially related to the loss of time consequence since future PSC 
examinations can delay the vessel in future U.S. ports.  
For further clarification, only one or more of the threats need to be present in 
order for the top event to occur. Likewise, not all the consequences list will occur if 








Figure 27. Threats and Consequences in Barrier BowTie Model 
 
Section 5.3: Risk Management  
Subsection 5.3.1: Preventive and Recovery Barrier Identification/Description 
 In accordance with the Barrier BowTie Methodology Manual (2015), the 
barriers are controls that either prevent or mitigate an event. Preventive barriers 
control or prevent the top event from occuring, whereas the recovery barriers mitigate 
the consequences resulting from the top event. If one or more of the preventive 
barriers fail, then the threat will cause the top event to occur. Likewise, if one or more 
of the recovery barriers fail, then the consequence is likely to occur due to lack of 





Figure 28 shows the preventive barriers. The preventive barriers were 
identified based on my personal experience in vessel inspections, as well as the 
insights from the research in Storkensen et al. (2017) and Lappalainen (2008). As 
mentioned in the Literature Review in Chapter 2, Storkensen et al. (2017) identified 
that there was a lack of critical thinking when it came to making safety-related 
decisions, such as which vessel systems/equipment to maintain and how to report 
safety incidents. They also mentioned that the complexity of SMSs contributed to the 
crew’s lack of adherence. Therefore, preventive barriers would include training the 
crew regularly on the procedures within the SMS, conducting audits to ensure 
compliance, and overall simplifying the procedure through clarifying the 
requirements within the SMS. Lappalainen (2008) also mentioned lack of standard 
interpretation of the ISM Code and the complexities that exist within SMSs. 
Therefore, the preventive barrier of clarifying SMS procedures could prevent failures 
of a vessel’s SMS.  
 
 





Figure 29 shows the recovery barriers. The preventive barriers were identified 
based on my personal experience in port state control vessel inspections and Potential 
Problem Analysis.  As seen in Subsection 3.3.2, the 5th step of Potential Problem 
Analysis includes defining measures to mitigate effects should the problem occur 
(Kepner and Tregoe, 1997). When looking at the top event as the problem or problem 
condition, these mitigation measures can be translated into preventive barriers.  
 
 
Figure 29. Recovery Barriers in Barrier BowTie Model 
  
Subsection 5.3.2: Identification of Escalation Factors and Barriers 
Escalation factors are those that cause the preventive or recovery factors to 
fail (IP Bank B.V., 2015). Escalation factors and their associated barriers for the 
preventive barriers are common to each threat and the first preventive barrier 
identified, which is to follow the SMS. Therefore, Figure 30 only shows the 





sample. The additionally escalation factors and barriers can be seen in Appendix B. 
The escalation factors and barriers were identified based on my personal experience 
in vessel inspections, as well as the insights from the research in Storkensen et al. 
(2017). As mentioned in the Literature Review in Chapter 2, Storkensen et al. (2017) 
identified crew complacency and complexity of the safety standards/SMS onboard as 
contributors to failing SMSs.  Therefore, they are added escalation factors to the 














Subsection 5.3.3: Identification of Triggers within the System  
 
 The last mitigation step in this thesis and in the potential problem analysis 
method is to identify triggers that can be placed or already exist within the system, 
which alert the stakeholders that the potential problem has occurred (Kepner and 
Tregoe, 1997). In this risk analysis, the potential problem is also defined as the top 
event, which is “vessel detention due to vessel SMS failures”. The only indicator that 
a vessel detention has occurred is that the port state control team has issued a 
detention. However, there are triggers that exist to indicate that there are failures with 
the vessel SMS. These triggers are part of auditing and port state control procedures 
prescribed in the ISM Code by the IMO. These triggers are not included in the model 
in Appendix B due to limitations in the model software. They are instead listed and 
described Table 3.  
Table 3. Current Triggers Identifying Failures within Vessel SMS Implementation 
 
Trigger Description
Flag State (Classification Society) Audit
Regular (Annual) Audit of the Vessel SMS; issue 
letter of non-conformity or deficiencies for  
Operating Management Company Review
Reviews SMS and issues new guidance on 
implementation; Issues corrective action plans if 
there is a deficiency or non-conformity
Crew Audit
Monthly Audits looking at different areas of 
SMS; correct deficiencies on the spot or create 
corrective action plan
U.S. Coast Guard Port State Control Examination
Examination of Documents/Certificates/Plans 
and vessel systems/equipment. Issue 
deficiencies and/or detention 
Other Port State Control Examinations
Examination of Documents/Certificates/Plans 
and vessel systems/equipment. Issue 






Section 5.4: Implications 
 As seen in Figure 9 (TreeMap) in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Vessel Safety 
Management deficiencies were the leading cause of detentions from 2004-2017. 
When vessel SMS deficiencies were broken down to the component level in Figure 
10, the failure to implement a SMS was frequently caused by a lack of maintenance 
of ship/equipment, the failure on the part of the master to take action based on his/her 
authority, the failure on part of the crew to document ship’s operations, and the 
failure on the part of the company to take action based on their responsibility. In 
relation to the risk analysis in Chapter 5, the deficiency data reinforced which threats 
(causes) were occurring and leading to the top event, in this case vessel detentions. 
The threats in the Barrier BowTie Model in Figure 27 were validated by this data as 
well as my personal experience. This deficiency data in Chapter 4 also gave the 
relative frequency of occurrence for these threats and allowed for a prioritization in 
terms of areas to focus on for mitigation. This integration of deficiency data analysis 
and the Barrier BowTie Model can be used to develop additional risk analysis models 
for other top events related to vessel detentions, such as engineering-related 
detentions or documentation-related detentions.   
 Furthermore, the preventive barriers identified in Figure 28, are related to the 
SMS deficiency-categories in Figure 10 because those deficiency areas demonstrated 
where barriers were overcome. For example, the high occurrence of SMS deficiencies 
related to maintaining vessel equipment/systems identified in Figure 10, demonstrated 
that the threat of lack of maintenance has preventative barriers that were ineffective 





also be due to the fact that the threat naturally occurs with such high frequency, since 
vessel maintenance is a costly and constant undertaking. The high frequency of one of 
the threats identified in Figure 27 could make threat mitigation more difficult due to 
higher costs associated with continuous mitigation. With the data of threat frequency 
and the Barrier BowTie model created in this thesis, a future next step could be to 
evaluate the strength and relative value of the different preventive barriers in Figure 





Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
Section 6.1: Summary of Findings  
 This thesis identified the causes of vessel detentions associated with vessel 
SMS implementation failures utilizing port state control deficiency data from 2004-
2017. Chapter 4, Section 4.1, detailed the context and descriptive statistics of vessel 
arrivals into the U.S., the port state control examinations performed, and the 
detentions that occurred. It was discovered that the number of unique vessels arriving 
into the U.S. has been increasing from 2004-2017, whereas the number of port state 
control safety examinations have been slowly decreasing. On the other hand, the 
number of detentions in the U.S. varied narrowly year-to-year with an average of 
142/year from 2004-2017. Of the detentions that occurred during this timeframe, a 
majority of them were caused by Operations/Management deficiencies onboard the 
vessels as shown in Section 4.2. Vessel Safety Management deficiencies made up 
34% of all Operations/Management deficiencies and were the most frequently 
occurring. Furthermore, it was discovered through the data analysis that the top four 
causes of SMS-related detentions were the failure to maintain the vessel’s 
equipment/systems, failure of the vessel’s master to act in accordance with his 
responsibilities, failure to appropriately document vessel operations, and failure to 
report in accordance with (IAW) vessel SMS (company responsibility/authority). The 
relationship between the port state control deficiency data in Chapter 4 and risk 





failures. These causes informed the threat assessment in the Barrier BowTie Model in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.  
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4., the data analysis showed that there are differing 
trends in the causes of detentions and the causes of SMS detentions based on vessel 
age and vessel service types. It was identified in this thesis that for vessels aged 1-40 
years and those that were 51 years or older, operations & management system 
deficiencies were the leading cause of detentions from 2004-2017, with the leading 
deficiency subsystem being vessel SMS implementation failures.  However, for 
vessel that were aged 41-50 years, documentation deficiencies were the leading cause 
of detentions.  
Additionally, the cluster analysis in Section 4.3 demonstrated that for SMS 
detention-related deficiencies, the deficiency trends clustered from ages 1-39 years 
and from ages 40-58 years based on the SMS deficiency component. Although in 
both age bins the majority of SMS detentions were caused by the lack of maintenance 
on the vessel or equipment, vessels aged 1-39 years had nearly double the percentage 
of total SMS deficiencies in this category. Furthermore, for vessels aged 40-58 years, 
there was an increased percentage of SMS deficiencies related to external 
certification when compared with the vessels aged 1-39. These results demonstrated 
there is a critical shift in SMS detention causes after a vessel exceeds 39 years old.  
Section 4.4 demonstrated that the deficiencies from freight vessels and tank 
vessels made up 90% of all detention-related deficiencies from 2004-2017. As 
expected, Operations/Management system deficiencies made up a majority of 





Deck/Cargo detention-related deficiencies due to the hazardous nature of the cargo 
onboard, which increased the detention risk due to cargo. The variations based on 
vessel age and vessel service uncovered in thesis, highlight the previously unexplored 
importance of these two factors when analyzing the risks and frequency of threats 
(causes) associated with vessel detentions.  
 The Barrier BowTie and Potential Problem Analysis risk analysis methods 
were integrated successfully in Chapter 5, which created a more in-depth risk 
assessment than one method alone could have provided. Following the Potential 
Problem Analysis steps, the Barrier BowTie Model was created following the 
integrated procedure in Section 3.3.4. This risk mitigation strategies created in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3 included preventive barriers, recovery barriers, escalation 
barriers, and the triggers. The subdivision of these mitigation strategies allowed for 
the risk analysis to address and mitigate various aspects of risk related to the top 
event of vessel detentions due to vessel SMS implementation failures. The preventive 
barriers in Figure 28 demonstrated the mitigation strategies that should be used to 
prevent the causes (threats) of the top event. The recovery barriers in Figure 29 
showed the mitigation areas that could be used to reduce or eliminate the 
consequences related to vessel detentions. The escalation barriers in Figure 30 
identified that mitigation strategies for preventing the escalation factors related to the 
weaknesses of the preventive barriers. The triggers identified in Table 3 were 
procedures already in place that allow for identification of vessel SMS failures prior 
to the top event taking place. Each of these barriers, whether individually or 





formed the complete risk mitigation analysis to the main problem of vessel SMS 
implementation failures, which led to detentions.  
Section 6.2: Recommendations  
As identified in the risk analysis in Figure 28, there are several preventive 
barriers, one or more of which could prevent a threat from causing a vessel detention. 
An additional preventive barrier that is recommended to prevent the threat of “Failure 
of Master to Act IAW Responsibilities in SMS” is an anonymous feedback system. 
This would be used by the crew to report vessel safety problems to the vessel 
management company and/or the flag state authority (or appointed classification 
society). This recommendation was also suggested by Lappalainen (2008). He 
identified that crew members often faced the fear of reprisal if they reported problems 
to their supervisor, usually the Chief Officer or the Chief Engineer, or to the vessel 
master. This assessment coincides with my own personal experience, which taught 
me that although most of the time the master of the vessel prioritizes safety onboard, 
there are some masters that are motivated by other things. These include 
complacency, greed due to financial incentives from a lack of safety problems while 
they are onboard, or fear of reprisal themselves. Crew members in these safety-
compromised situations occasionally sought other methods of reporting, such as 
whistleblowing to port state control officers. However, if unsubstantiated or if the 
master or other crew learned of the crew members’ report, there would often be 
reprisal. Therefore, an anonymous feedback system would provide a balance between 
the crew’s desire for a safe vessel and the master’s control over the crew’s reference 





 The safety feedback system that I recommend should be both anonymous and 
voluntary, and each crew member should have equal access to it. In the aviation 
community, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) exists to allow any 
member, at any level, of the aviation industry to file a safety report. As seen on the 
ASRS website, this data is used to correct safety problems that require immediate 
attention, to collect and analyze safety data to inform policy, and to decrease the 
potential for aviation accidents (Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2019). There are 
two ways to report using this system to include online and through the mail. The 
anonymous safety feedback system that I am proposing should include at a minimum 
these two methods of reporting to allow for maximum anonymity and accessibility.  
 One of the challenges to implementing this feedback system is the ownership 
and creation of this system. I propose that the ownership and creation of the feedback 
system would be best handled by the IMO and then implemented by the individual 
flag states who are signatory to the IMO. This would allow for better uniformity of 
reports and safety data received through a central online reporting platform and 
standard reporting forms. It would also allow the IMO, as well as the flag states, to 
collect this safety data for incorporation into safety bulletins and future safety 
regulations/standards.  
 Additionally, it is recommended that the USCG and the IMO adopt the data-
informed risk analysis method carried out in this thesis to assess and update vessel 
safety management standards. In the short term, these organizations can assess 
updates to the safety management system standards based on the threats and barriers 





escalation factors/barriers using additional port state control data, the IMO and/or 
USCG can further understand the additional ways that regulations and additional 
policies can be used mitigate the risk of vessel detentions from SMS deficiencies.  
Furthermore, based on the risk analysis, it is recommended that vessel 
management companies and owners review and perform additional evaluations of the 
threats, preventive barriers, and escalation factors/barriers. This would allow these 
stakeholders to create effective strategies to better implement SMS onboard their 
vessel through understanding the most common causes of failure. One of the most 
common barriers across each of the threats is to reduce the complexity of the SMS to 
make it easier to implement onboard. Therefore, it is recommended that each vessel 
management company review the complexity of the SMS onboard their vessels. This 
can be done through verbally testing the master and crew on their knowledge of the 
SMS.  Additionally, it is recommended that an evaluation of recovery barriers be 
performed to understand better ways to reduce the effects of vessel detentions when 
they do occur and allow for contingency plans to be put in place prior to a vessel 
detention.   
Section 6.3: Contributions 
As demonstrated in this thesis, the integration of a systems engineering view 
of the safety management system and risk analysis can provide new insights into the 
SMS as a whole and show how SMS implementation can be improved onboard 
international vessels.  The deficiency and detention data analysis in Chapter 4 
provided a foundation for the risk analysis in Chapter 5, and identified the priority of 





stakeholders. Moreover, Chapter 4 involved a unique study of the factors of vessel 
age and vessel service and demonstrated that variations in the detention causes exist 
based on these factors. These two factors have not been a focus of vessel safety 
management and vessel detention literature in the past. The variations based on vessel 
age and vessel service uncovered in this thesis, highlight the previously understated 
importance of these two factors when analyzing the risks and frequency of threats 
(causes) associated with vessel detentions. Moreover, the cluster analysis showed a 
shift in the causes of SMS detentions after a vessel ages 39 years. This knowledge can 
be used by stakeholders to address unique risks regarding vessel SMS implementation 
based on the age of the vessel, as well as the vessel service type. This can be 
accomplished through specific policies from the Flag States, USCG, IMO, and/or 
vessel management companies. Also, this knowledge can update the training given to 
masters and crew members regarding challenges to SMS implementation based on the 
specific age and vessel service areas.  
Furthermore, this thesis utilized vessel detention data analysis and the 
integration of the Barrier BowTie and Potential Problem Analysis risk assessment 
methods to provide an innovative view into vessel safety management failures, which 
can assist vessel stakeholders. With the knowledge of the causes and barriers of 
detentions related to vessel SMS failures, stakeholders, mainly vessel management 
companies, vessel crews, and vessel owners, can identify potential areas of 
improvement for vessel safety management system implementation. Furthermore, 
stakeholders can utilize this deficiency data and the risk analyses to better understand 





from occurring in the future. Moreover, they can utilize the additional mitigation 
strategies of the recovery barriers, the escalation barriers, and the triggers to both 
identify a vessel SMS failure has occurred and to mitigate the effects. This knowledge 
can be used to focus efforts on strengthening or implementing new barriers through 
the identification of gaps within a company’s SMS implementation. This could 
reduce the potential for threat occurrence with the goal of reducing vessel detentions 
overall, which would reduce the burden on U.S. and international port state control 
programs.  
Moreover, this data and risk analyses in this thesis can be used by the IMO 
and other maritime regulating authorities (Flag and Port states) to understand the 
principal causes of vessel detentions and the variations based on vessel age and 
service, as well as the effectiveness of barriers to prevent detentions. This can be 
useful in developing specific regulations or international standards that enforce the 
strengthening of barrier effectiveness, as well as increase the barriers intended to 
mitigate the potential consequences should a detention occur.  
Lastly, the technique applied in this thesis and relationship drawn between 
deficiency data analysis and Barrier BowTie/Potential Problem risk analysis can be 
applied to other transportation systems, specifically those that have safety 
management systems already regulated by law or in practice through industrial 
policy.  In the United States, the main transportation systems include aviation, transit 
(bus) systems, and rail systems. Although detentions are solely utilized in the 
international maritime community, aviation, bus and rail systems each have a similar 





thesis can be applied to these safety mechanisms to analyze risks of safety failures 
using historic data. Unlike rail and transit systems, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) currently implements a continuous data-informed risk analysis 
method for safety management as part of the aviation SMS program. As seen on the 
FAA website, the main difference between their risk analysis methodology and this 
thesis’ methodology is that there is no subdivision among the various control 
measures (barriers) as there is in the Barrier BowTie method. There is also no 
identification of triggers that identify when safety failures occur (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2019). Therefore, this techniques in this thesis could be analyzed by 
the FAA with the intention of incorporating additional risk analysis techniques to 
improve the risk analysis and overall aviation safety management system program.  
  
Section 6.4: Limitations 
 The limitations of this thesis are distributed among the data set, the data 
analysis, the risk analysis approach, and the risk analysis itself. First, the data set 
collected for the data analysis in Chapter 4 was exclusively from U.S. Coast Guard 
Port State databases and therefore does not include additional port state examination 
data from other countries. This means that the data analysis does not encompass all 
the vessel detentions and deficiencies across the international maritime community. 
Instead, it used the data from USCG sources as a sample population of all 
international maritime vessels.  Furthermore, the data analysis in Chapter 4 was 
exploratory in nature. Due to the size of the data collected and the focus of this thesis, 





and to the factors of vessel age and vessel service. Additionally, these factors were 
unable to be analyzed further due to time constraints and the defined scope of this 
thesis.  
 The limitations of the Barrier BowTie Model were first in the method itself 
and then with the software used. As described in Section 2.2, this threats, barriers, 
and consequences identified in this thesis have dependencies that could not be 
distinguished in the model. Additionally, the BowTieXP software used to create the 
model makes the barriers look like they must all fail in order to cause the top event, 
escalation factor, or consequence. However, this is not the case as failure of one or 
more barriers could cause the undesired effect. Lastly, the software is limited in the 
integration of Potential Problem Analysis as it could not incorporate the triggers 
identified.  
 Finally, the risk analysis model was not validated by additional subject matter 
experts due to time constraints. The model was solely informed based on the data 
analysis, the literature review, and my personal experiences as a marine inspector for 
the U.S. Coast Guard.  
Section 6.5: Future work  
Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the data related to vessel age and 
vessel service should be further analyzed to study the variations in vessel detention 
causes based on these factors. This additional analysis could lead to the development 
of a collection of more specific Barrier BowTie Models that focus on vessels of 
different age and vessel service categories. Work in this area could serve to inform 





example, if a vessel management company managed only tank vessels, a Barrier 
BowTie Model informed with data only relating to tank vessel detentions and 
deficiencies, would give a more detailed and accurate risk analysis and mitigation 
strategies.  Likewise, if a vessel owner has only vessels that are older than 40 years 
old, a Barrier BowTie Model might reveal different risk mitigation strategies than if 
that vessel owner owned vessels younger than 40 years old.  
Another area of further research is the analysis of the barriers identified in 
Chapter 5.3. This future analysis could be used to study the effectiveness (or 
ineffectiveness) of different preventive, recovery, and escalation barriers and the 
causes of barrier failure. Moreover, research into quantifying the relative frequency of 
the threats as well as the relative value of the barriers would help inform this analysis. 
This could further assist stakeholders in resource allocation in order to best prevent 
SMS failures and vessel detentions.  
Lastly, as mentioned in Section 6.2, another area of future work is through 
application of the safety failure data analysis and risk analysis (Barrier BowTie and 
Potential Problem Analysis integration) in different transportation areas. As the FAA 
already uses a data informed risk analysis in their safety management system, it is 
recommended that the methods used in this thesis be applied to transportation systems 
that do not already have risk analysis incorporated into their safety management 
system or practices. The two transportation areas within the United States that could 
benefit most from this research are the federal transit system and the federal rail 
system. Both transportation areas lack structured and data-informed risk analysis as 





techniques used in this thesis to include historic safety data analysis and risk analysis, 
the stakeholders in these industries could benefit by understanding further causes of 
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